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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
THE PRAGMATICS OF SCIENTIFIC LAWS 
MICHAEL A. DAY 
Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
What it is for a statement to be a scientific law has been widely diScussed 
and debated in the philosophy of science. Not only is the question interesting 
in itself, but it is essential that this question be answered if a complete 
analysis of such things as scientific explanation and prediction are to be given. 
The purpose of this paper will be to put forward an analysis of the phrase "X 
is reasonably classified as a scientific law at time t" in such a way as to 
highlight certain pragmatical aspects of scientific laws while doing justice to 
the syntactical and semantical aspects of scientific laws. One important 
insight this analysis will bring out is that the concept of reduction (in the 
sense of theory reduction) has an essential role in what is reasonably classified 
as a scientific law. 
My strategy will be to put forward and discuss an analysis which 
attempts to formulate, in some sense, the syntactical and seman tical aspects 
of scientific laws, and then to use this anlaysis (with a slight modification) to 
put forward an analysis of the phrase "X is reasonably classified as a scientific 
law at time t". But before considering this first analysis, a few preliminary 
remarks must be made. 
First of all, I do not want to concern myself with the question whether 
scientific laws are sentences or whether they are propositions (i.e., what can 
be expressed by a declarative sentence). But for the sake of this paper, I am 
going to construe scientific laws as sentences. Now if one is convinced that 
scientific laws are propositions, he must at least admit that if we could 
determine what conditions must be satisfied for a sentence to express a 
scientific law, then we have come a long way in determining the nature of 
scientific laws; hence we can justify an investigation of sentences as relevant 
to the nature of scientific laws, even if scientific laws are propositions. Also, 
treating scientific laws as sentences will require the relativizing of our 
discussion to particular languages. For example, if we claim that sentence X is 
confirmed with respect to sentence Y, then the truth value of this claim will 
depend upon the language which X and Yare members. Now this relativizing 
to particular languages will not be explicitly stated in the following account, 
hence one must keep this implicitly in mind. 
Now before putting forth the first analysis, an explanation must be given 
of what will be meant by a framework. Consider the following: 
An ordered pair <A,B> is a framework if and only if A and B are each 
consistent sets of sentences closed under entailment (i.e., if a subset of 
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sentences from either set entails a sentence S, then S is a member of that 
set ). 
With this in mind, let us put forth the first analysis. 
X is a scientific law of framework F (where F = <A,B» IFF 
(1) X is a member of A, 
(2) X is an unrestricted general sentence, 
(3) X is empirical, 
(4) X is confirmed with respect to B, 
(5) X is not a compound sentence, and 
(6) there is no sentence Y which satisfies conditions (1) - (5) and is 
an F-generalization of X. 
Now this is explicitly an analysis (or definition) of a binary relation which 
can hold between a sentence and an ordered pair whose members are sets of 
sen tences. Implicitly, it is an analysis of a three-placed relation which can 
hold between a sentence, an ordered pair whose members are sets of 
sentences, and a language. Also, it must be realized that if there exists a 
sentence X which is a scientific law of some framework, this does not imply 
that X is a scientific law or that X is even reasonably classified as a scientific 
law. For example, let A only consist of the sentence "All planets move 
around the sun in rectangular orbits" (which we will call "Z") and all 
sentences entailed by the sentence Z, and let B be identical to A. Now a case 
(and a good case at that) can be made that sentence Z is a scientific law of 
<A,B>, but this should not be viewed as committing us to the claim that 
sentence Z is a scientific law or that sentence Z is now or ever was or will be 
reasonably classified as a scientific law. Perhaps if certain conditions were 
satisfied by the framework <A,B>, then we might be committed to such 
claims. 
Let us now turn to a discussion of conditions (1 )-( 6) of the above 
analysis. First of all, the motivation behind condition (1) will become obvious 
as the paper develops, and there should be no problem in understanding what 
it requires. 
The second condition is included so that only sentences which are (in 
some sense) universal will be reasonably classified as scientific laws. I will not 
say what should actually be included in this condition since my main concern 
is not with the syntactical and semantical characteristics of scientific laws. 
But let me say something about what might be included in condition (2). 
Firstly, this condition could be construed, in part, as requiring that the 
scientific laws of a framework are to be syntactically universal [Hempel, 
1965, p. 266]. For example, if the sentences under consideration are 
sentences of English, condition (2) might require the scientific laws of a 
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framework to be sentences that begin with such words as "all" or "every" 
followed by a subject expression (or that they could be so formulated 
without change of meaning). Or if the sentences are sentences of first-order 
predicate calculus, condition (2) might require an "essential" occurrence of a 
universal quantifier. H. A. Lauter in his discussion of Reichenbach's views on 
scientific laws sets forth a plausible requirement: "every reduced prenex 
equivalent of ¢ has at least one occurrence of a universal quantifier" [Lauter 
1970, p. l34]. Condition (2) might also be interpreted as requiring that th: 
scientific laws of a framework cannot mention particular objects, places, Or 
times. Further, it could even require that the predicates of the scientific laws 
be purely qualitative (i.e., it is possible to give the meanings of the predicates 
without reference to particular objects, places, or times) [Hempel, 1965, p. 
268 J . Also, condition (2) could require that a scientific law of a framework is 
such that the evidence for the law does not exhaust the "scope of 
predication" of the law [Nagel, 1961, p. 63 J. (In this case, the evidence 
relating to a law of framework F=<A,B> would be the sentences of B.) 
Finally, condition (2) might be interpreted as also requiring that the scientific 
laws of a framework are not restricted to descriptions of actual cases but 
extend to the realm of hypothetical cases, in other words, that they Support 
relevant counterfactuals [Rescher, 1970, p. 102]. 
Condition (3) is included in the analysis so as not to allow sentences 
which are truths or falsehoods of mathematics and logic as being scientific 
laws of a framework. Further, the condition can be interpreted as ruling out 
sentences which are analytically true or false as being possible candidates for 
the scientific laws of a framework. 
The motivation behind condition (4) is based upon the fact that we will 
want to hold that a sentence is reasonably classified as a scientific law at a 
particular time only if it is confirmed at that particular time; hence we 
require the scientific laws of a framework to satisify condition (4). Now since 
confirmation is usually construed as a relation between sentences (provided 
one is working with sentences), condition (2) has relativized the confirmation 
of a scientific law of framework <A,B> to the set of sentences B. Further, 
condition (4) might be interpreted as requiring not only "direct" confirma-
tion of a scientific law of a framework but also "indirect" or "systematic" 
confirmation [Nagel, 1961, p. 64-66]. 
Condition (5) is included in this analysis because we do not want to hold 
that a sentence (which satisfies certain conditions) is reasonably classified as a 
scientific law when the sentence is actually a conjunction one of whose 
conjuncts is a scientific law. For example, consider a sentence formed by the 
conjunction of Newton's second law and the first law of thermodynamics. 
Now provided certain conditions are met, we would be, committed to the 
position that this conjunction is reasonably classified as a scientific law if we 
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Jjd nul include condition (5) in this analysis. Note that the natural thing to 
say cOllc:erning this sentence is that it is not a scientific law but a conjunction 
cllnsiSlJilg of scientific laws. 
l\ow to determine whether a sentence is a non-compound sentence will 
'uall v require (unless we have a strong correlation between syntax and U' • 
seman lles) an inspection of what is expressed by the sentence. Consider the 
lolloWllig sentence: 
Aii heavenly objects are god-beloved and all terrestrial objects are 
god-beloved. 
\oW this sentence may appear to be a compound sentence if we only 
obser\'Cd its syntax, but actually it is a non-compound sentence since what it 
cxpressc:s with respect to English is that all objects are god-beloved. 
To understand condition (6), an explanation of what is meant by an 
f.gencralization must be given. Consider the following: 
Y I'; an F-generalization of X if and only if(l) Y entails X but X does not 
entJil Y, or (2) Y can be established as a generalization of X on the basis 
01 the facts expressed by the sentences of A and B and a competent 
knowledge of the language of which the sentences A and B are members 
(where F = <A,B». 
The motivation behind condition (6) is that we want only the most general 
sentem:es of A to be the scientific laws of framework F. This will eventually 
allow llS to incorporate in the final analysis Peter Achinstein's insight (with 
certain qualiflcations) as given in the following quotation. 
"(5)' If it is reasonable at time t to classify L as a law then either: (a) 
thel e is not known at t any proposition L' which is known or believed to 
be CI generalization of L in any of its equivalent formulations and which 
is believed is or might be true; or (b) at some previous time t* when L 
was known and was classified as a law there was not known any 
proposition L' of the sort described in (a)." [Achinstein, 1971, p. 
33·34]. (Note: Achinstein uses the term "proposition" to mean a 
declarative sentence.) 
I\ow 10 fully understand condition (6) and the above quotation, an analysis 
of what is meant by "Y is a generalization of X" should be given. But this 
would be a dift1cult undertaking and is certainly beyond the scope of this 
paper. Actually, Achinstein has put forward such an analysis [Achinstein, 
1971, Ch. II], but not only are there counterexamples to his analysis 
invohing ordinary usuage but if his analysis of a generalization is adopted 
then criterion (5)' in the above quotation is false. Therefore, since criterion 
(5)' of the above quotation appears to be true, we will leave the analysis of 
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.'y is a generalization of X" on the intuitive level. But one comment must be 
made. Whether a sentence Y is a generalization of a sentence X can 
sometimes, but not always. be established on basis of an understanding of the 
language of which the sentences X and Yare members. For example, consider 
the following two pairs of sentences. 
(l)' All men are good cooks. 
All bachelors are good cooks. 
(2/ All people with chromozone Z ;.,re susceptible to can;;er. 
All John's children are susceptible to cancer. 
The first member of (1)' can be established as a generalization of the second 
member of (1)' if one has an adequate understanding of English, but such is 
not the case for the second pair of sen tences. Now if one knows that all 
John's children have cbomozone Z, one could establish that the first member 
of (2)' is a generalization of the second member of (2)' (provided one had an 
adequate understanding of English.) 
Looking critically at the above analysis of "X is a scientific law of 
framework F," it must be admitted that the analysis is not free from 
problems. First of all, the analysis presupposes an understanding of such 
problematic issues as involved in the distinction between empirical and 
nonempirical sentences, the distinction between compound and non. 
compound sentences, and the theory of confirmation Gust to mention a few). 
But in defense of the analysis, it must be contended that such problems are 
not unique to this analysis since analogous problems confront all analyses. 
Secondly, one might object to this analysis since it is not clear what the 
conditions of the analysis are to include. For example, a definite position has 
not been taken with respect to what is included in condition (2) of the 
analysis. Does it require or does it not require that the scientific laws of a 
framework must support relevant counterfactuals? In response to this 
objection, I can only say that I have attempted to leave the analysis 
somewhat open, in this respect, so as to remain as neutral as possible with 
respect to positions which might be taken concerning the syntactical and 
seman tical aspects of scientific laws, since my main concern is with certain 
pragmatic aspects of scientific laws. Thirdly, one may feel uneasy about this 
analysis since traditionally analyses of scientific laws have not made 
references to so-called frameworks, where this analysis does; and this analysis 
appears to relativize our talk of scientific laws to frameworks, which appears 
not to be the case. To dispel this uneasiness, I can only conjecture that past 
analyses have not made references to frameworks since they have mainly been 
concerned with the syntactical and semantical aspects of scientific laws over 
the pragmatical aspects. Further, it must be remembered that even if it is true 
that a sentence X is a scientific law of a certain framework, this does not 
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commit us to the claim that X is a scientific law or reasonably classifIed as a 
scientific law. Also, it does seem to be the case that our talk of scientific laws 
is in one important sense relativized to a framework, namely to the 
jramework which represents what is currently accepted by the scientific 
community. 
Let us now attempt to formulate certain pragmatical aspects of scientific 
laWS by giving an analysis of the phrase "X is reasonably classified as a 
scientific law at time t." This analysis will be based upon the fact that certain 
sentences which were reasonably classified in the past as scientific laws are 
still so classified even though it is now known that there are counter-instances 
to these laws, or that these laws are incomplete in their descriptions, or that 
these laws are in some sense mistaken. For example, Newton's laws of motion 
and the second law of thermodynamics are still reasonably classified as 
scientific laws even though there are known counter-instances to these laws. 
But it is not simply the fact that what was reasonably classified in the past as 
a scientific law is still so classified; for example, the laws of phlogiston theory 
are not reasonably classified as scientific laws today. It appears that if these 
past scientific laws are still to be reasonably classified as scientific laws, they 
must satisfy the additional requirement of being reducible to (or, roughly 
speaking, explainable by) what is currently accepted by the scientific 
community. 
The formulation of these pragmatic factors will involve a slight 
modification in the notion of a framework (and an appropriate use of the 
concept of theory reduction). We will allow a temporal index to be associated 
with each framework so that a framework can represent what is accepted 
by the scientific community at a particular time; hence we can speak of the 
accepted scientific framework at a particular time. For the sake of brevity 
and clarity, the analysis to be put forth will make use of the previous 
analysis: 
X is reasonably classified as a scientific law at time tIFF (1) X is a 
scientific law of Ft, where Ft is the accepted scientific framework at time 
t, or (2) X is a scientific law of Fti, where Ft ', is a past (t' < t) accepted 
scientific framework, and X is reducible to Ft. 
It must be realized that the accepted scientific framework at a particular time 
t will ultimately have to be abstracted from what was accepted by the 
scientific community at time t. But this should not be taken to mean that 
what is to be construed as the accepted scientific framework at time t is 
arbitrarily selected or that it will not meet certain formal, epistemic, and 
, empirical requirements. For example, if Ft=<A,B> is the accepted scientific 
framework at time t, the sentences of B would consist of all and only all 
observation sentences which were accepted as true by the scientific 
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community at time t. Further, we could require that the sentences of B Were 
accepted as true at time t on the basis of certain observations that had been 
made by time t, and that it is reasonable to accept these sentences as true on 
the basis of these observations. Also, we would require that the sentences of 
A are sentences that were accepted by the scientific community at time t. 
Further, we could require that the sentences of A were accepted, to a 
substantial degree, on the basis of the acceptance of the truth of the 
observation sentences of B, and that it is reasonable to accept the sentences 
of A provided that the sentences of B are accepted as true. But a complete 
discussion of the requirements that an accepted scientific framework must 
satisfy, though necessary, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
For the rest of the paper, let us assume that the above analysis is 
adequate and determine some of the more interesting results which follow 
from this analysis. First of all, the analysis allows it to be reasonable to 
simultaneously classify a sentence and a generalization of it as scientific laws, 
if the sentence and its generalization are members of appropriate accepted 
scientific frameworks. Further, it even allows it to be reasonable to 
simultaneously classify a sentence as a scientific law but not one of its 
generalizations even when the generalization is a member of an accepted 
scientific framework and confirmed within that framework. This can happen 
because the accepted scientific framework of which the generalization is a 
member may at the time of its acceptance contain a higher generalization, 
and hence rule out this lower generalization as being a scientific law of the 
framework. For example, we want it to be reasonable to classify Kepler's 
second law of planetary motion (i.e., any radius from the sun to a planet 
sweeps out equal areas in equal times) as a scientific law, but not arbitrary 
generalizations of Kepler's second law whose subjects would consist in 
arbitrarily specified planetary systems. The above analysis will allow for such 
discriminating classifications since the analysis has incorporated Achinstein's 
insight as given in the earlier quotation. We can also explain such a 
discriminating classification with respect to Kepler's second law because of 
the pragmatic fact that at the time of the acceptance of Kepler's second law, 
there was not known any generalization of it which was confirmed with 
respect to the accepted scientific framework of that time; whereas no such 
fact holds for these arbitrary generalizations of Kepler's second law. 
Moreover, since this analysis has included the spirit of Achinstein's insight, we 
must mention what Achinstein says about how this settles the dispute 
between those philosophers who hold that scientific laws cannot mention 
particular objects, places, or times, and those philosophers who hold that it is 
permissible for scientific laws to mention particular objects, places, or times. 
He says, using slightly different wording, that both disputants are partially 
correct from a pragmatical point of view, in the sense that, a sentence 
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mentioning particular objects, places, or times can be reasonably classified as 
J scientific law but only if there is no generalization of the law which was 
known and confirmed at the time when the law was originally accepted 
lAc!llnstein p. 31-32]. 
According to the above analysis, a sentence can be reasonably classified 
as a scientific law if it bears an appropriate reduction relation as well as 
satisfying certain other conditions. Reduction is generally construed as a 
relation which can exist between theories, and therefore the condition which 
requires a sentence to be reducible to an appropriate scientific framework 
should be taken as requiring the reducibility of the theory, which the 
sentence is a member, to a theory of the appropriate scientiflc framework. 
Just what it means to say that one theory is reducible to another theory is a 
difficult question to answer; but it has been informally characterized as one 
theory explaining or accounting for another theory. One thing that is clear is 
that reduction cannot simply be construed as the derivability of one theory 
from another. Because if it was, then the theory which is reduced could in no 
way be incompatible with the reducing theory; but in many cases of 
reduction, the two theories are not mutually compatible. 
With this brief discussion of reduction in mind, we see that the above 
analysis allows for the possibility that two (or more) sentences which are in 
contradiction or lead to contradictory results can at the same time be 
reasonably classified as scientific laws, as long as these sentences are members 
of accepted scientific frameworks and bear the appropriate reduction 
relations. For example, the above analysis allows for the possibility that the 
second law of thermodynamics and the laws of statistical mechanics can be 
reasonably and simultaneously classified as scientiflc laws, which seems to be 
a desirable result of the analysis. 
Also, the above analysis puts a new twist to some of the problems 
surrounding the truth of scientific laws. For example, a question could arise 
as to whether it is reasonable to classify a sentence which is known to be false 
as a scientific law. Many philosophers would say that it is not since scientific 
laws are simply true nomological sentences. Other philosophers would agree, 
but for the different reason that since scientific laws are analogous to rules of 
inference, they are not capable of being false since they are not capable of 
any truth value at all. But in view of the above analysis of "X is reasonably 
classified as a scientific law at time t," the possibility certainly exists that it 
may be reasonable to classify a sentence which is known to be false as a 
scientific law if the sentence is reducible to the appropriate scientific 
framework. This is because reduction, as earlier pointed out, is not simply a 
deductive relation, and hence even allows for the possibility that a sentence 
may be false (and therefore known to be false) and still be reducible to a set 
of true sentences. 
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As a concluding comment, I would like to say something about the 
identity conditions for scientific laws. In this paper, it has been assumed for 
the sake of discussion that scientific laws are sentences. Now if one does 
construe scientific laws as sentences, then one would construe the identity 
conditions for scientiflc laws as being the identity conditions for individual 
sentences. Perhaps one might construe scientific laws not as individual 
sentences but as sentence-types, and hence would individuate laws With 
respect to the identity conditions for sentence-types. Also, one might 
construe scientific laws as propositions, and hence would individuate laws 
with respect to the identity conditions for propositions. No matter which 
position is taken on the identity conditions for scientific laws, each position 
would then attempt to explain our talk about scientific laws in terms of the 
proposed identity conditions of that position. 
Now suppose we had two sentences of different sentence-types, and said 
of each sentence that it was the same scientific law (for example, we might 
say of each sentence that it is Newton's second law of motion). If we 
construed laws as being sentences or sentence-types, we might explain this by 
saying that each sentence is called Newton's second law because each 
sentence or each instance of each sentence-type has the same meaning. If we 
construed scientific laws as propositions, we might explain this by saying that 
each sentence expresses the same proposition. But such explanations will not 
always work. Consider the following sentences [Zemansky, 1957, Ch. 7]: 
(1)" No process is possible whose sole result is the absorption of heat 
from a reservoir and the conversion of this heat into work. 
(2)"No process is possible whose sole result is the transfer of heat from a 
cooler to a hotter body. 
Now each sentence can be referred to as the second law of thermodynamics. 
The first sentence is referred to as the Kelvin-Plank formulation of the second 
law; the second sentence is referred to as the Clausius formulation of the 
second law. But how do we explain this, since neither sentence means the 
same thing or expresses the same proposition? It appears that to explain this 
we are gomg to have to say something about how each of these sentences is 
related to other sentences. For example, given a certain set of 
sentences (representing the background of thermodynamics), both of the 
above sentences can be used to construct a proof for the existence of a 
certain thermodynamic function of state, called the entropy. And one can 
construe that the main contribution of the second law of thermodynamics (to 
thermodynamics) is that the second law guarantees the existence of the 
entropy function; hence we can explain why both of the above sentences can 
be referred to as the second law of thermodynamics, even though they do not 
have the same meaning or express the same proposition. 
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